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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Mario Abreu appeals from the District Court’s order 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
(“Commonwealth”) argues on appeal that Abreu’s habeas 
petition is moot because after the notice of appeal was filed in 
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this Court, federal authorities removed Abreu to the Dominican 
Republic, and a federal conviction not at issue here 
permanently bars Abreu’s reentry to the United States.  For the 
following reasons, we will vacate and remand with instructions 




In April of 2004, Abreu was charged by the 
Commonwealth with twenty-two drug-related counts, which 
alleged that he sold cocaine, marijuana, and ecstasy in 
Northumberland, Snyder, and surrounding counties.  After a 
five-day trial, a jury found Abreu guilty on all counts, and he 
was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-seven to fifty-
four years of imprisonment.  The court ordered that sentence 
to run consecutively to a federal sentence Abreu was currently 
serving after a 2003 arrest.  Abreu appealed, and the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.  Abreu did not appeal that 
ruling. 
 
Abreu later sought relief under the Pennsylvania Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), also to no avail.  Then, on 
July 29, 2015, Abreu filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 in the District Court.  Abreu alleged that his PCRA 
counsel’s assistance was ineffective in failing to assert that his 
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.  The 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny 
Abreu’s habeas petition because his claims were “barred by the 
doctrine of procedural default,” and he “has not established 
cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome this default” 
because his claims “are without merit.”  Appendix (“App.”) 
35–36.  The District Court adopted this recommendation in its 
entirety.   
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Abreu timely appealed, and we granted a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”) “as to [Abreu’s] claim that trial counsel 
performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the admission 
of . . . grand jury testimony.”  App. 2.  We later expanded the 
COA to include Abreu’s claim that “trial counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing to seek to strike testimony from [a 
police officer] recounting statements made by [other 
individuals].”  App. 4.   
 
While Abreu’s appeal was pending in this Court, 
however, he was removed from the United States.  On May 9, 
2019, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole granted 
Abreu’s application for early parole under 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6143, which allows for the early parole of inmates subject to 
a federal removal order.  Abreu was released to the custody of 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and then 




The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 and 2254, and Abreu claims that we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  As always, 
though, “we must satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction.”  
Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 
2012).  And our standard of review concerning questions of our 
own jurisdiction, including whether a claim has been rendered 
moot, is plenary.  See Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 




Abreu appeals the District Court’s denial of a writ of 
habeas corpus, but we can only review that order if there is a 
live case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.  So, we address that threshold question. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that because Abreu has 
been removed, his habeas petition must be dismissed as moot.  
It argues that regardless of whether Abreu obtains habeas relief 
from his state court conviction — the conviction at issue in his 
petition — he is barred permanently from reentering the United 
States because of his 2003 federal heroin trafficking conviction 
under 21 U.S.C. § 846, which Abreu does not challenge in this 
appeal.  Abreu, on the other hand, claims that his habeas 
petition is not moot despite his removal to the Dominican 
Republic.  Specifically, Abreu contends that because he 
continues to suffer collateral consequences from the state 
conviction at issue in his underlying petition, his appeal still 
presents a live controversy.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘judicial 
Power’ to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”  Toll 
Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).  For a case or 
controversy to exist, a petitioner, throughout each stage of the 
litigation, “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual 
injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by 
a favorable judicial decision.”  DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 
F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank 
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).  As a result, a habeas corpus 
petition generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released 
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from custody because the petitioner has received the relief 
sought.  See id. at 441. 
 
Nevertheless, a habeas petitioner who has been released 
may obtain judicial review of a petition by showing that he 
continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences 
of his conviction.  See Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 
384 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 
(1998) (explaining that a habeas petitioner who is no longer in 
custody must demonstrate a “concrete and continuing injury” 
that is a “collateral consequence” of the conviction to satisfy 
the case-or-controversy requirement).  But once a petitioner 
has been released, we do not presume that a conviction carries 
collateral consequences.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 
142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).  Rather, as the Supreme Court has 
instructed, we must “address[] the issue of collateral 
consequences in terms of the ‘likelihood’ that a favorable 
decision would redress the injury or wrong.”  Id. (citing 
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14–16; Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477–78).  It is 
not enough if “collateral consequences proffered by the 
petitioner” amount to “a possibility rather than a certainty or 
even a probability.”  Id. (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14–16).  
 
Abreu points to several possible collateral 
consequences from his state conviction, which he argues cause 
a continuing injury sufficient to save his petition from 
mootness.  Abreu contends first that his state conviction, as it 
stands, prevents him from applying for reentry into the United 
States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), which renders inadmissible 
aliens convicted of certain crimes.  And, Abreu posits, if he 
reenters, he will have to serve out the maximum balance of his 
state sentence, and he will be subject to further prosecution 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which prohibits the unauthorized 
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reentry of removed aliens.  As explained below, however, none 
of these proposed collateral consequences are sufficient to 
avoid a mootness determination under these circumstances, 
where Abreu has a federal conviction that separately bars him 
from reentering the United States and is not challenged in this 




Abreu asserts that because he has been removed, his 
state conviction prevents him from applying for reentry into 
the United States.  We are not convinced. 
 
This Court has previously determined that a habeas 
petition is not moot simply because the petitioner has been 
removed.  See Chong, 264 F.3d at 385–86; Steele v. Blackman, 
236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001).  As we have explained, 
“[w]here a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed and 
subsequently the petitioner is released from custody, habeas 
corpus jurisdiction may be sustained where serious collateral 
consequences flow from the conviction.”  Steele, 236 F.3d at 
134 n.4.  In concluding that the petitions in Steele and Chong 
were not moot, we determined that the petitioners had alleged 
facts sufficient to show continuing injuries and serious 
collateral consequences because their convictions prevented 
their reentry to the United States.  See Chong, 264 F.3d at 386 
(“[W]e hold that [the petitioner’s] inability to reenter the 
United States for ten years after her deportation is a sufficient 
collateral consequence stemming from the Board’s order of 
removal to render [the] petition justiciable under Article III, 
§ 2.”); Steele, 236 F.3d at 134 n.4 (“Erroneous conviction of 
an aggravated felony will have several continuing and serious 
legal consequences for [an alien], including serving as a 
8 
permanent bar preventing his return to the United States to visit 
his family.”).  And this is for good reason:  removal or 
deportation has long been recognized as a particularly severe 
penalty.  See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) 
(“[D]eportation may result in the loss of all that makes life 
worth living.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
But we hold today that there is an exception to this 
general rule.  A habeas petition does not continue to present a 
live controversy once the petitioner has been removed if the 
grounds for habeas relief will not redress the collateral 
consequences complained of by the petitioner.  That is the case 
we are presented with here.  Although Abreu claims he is 
similarly situated to the petitioners in Steele and Chong 
because his state conviction prevents his reentry into the 
United States, this argument ignores a key difference:  Abreu’s 
criminal history.  He, unlike the petitioners in Steele and 
Chong, is also barred from reentry based on a different 
conviction that separately renders him inadmissible under 
federal law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) (“Any alien who 
. . . is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance 
. . . or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, 
conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in 
any such controlled or listed substance . . . is inadmissible.”); 
see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (identifying heroin as a Schedule I 
controlled substance under subsection (b)(10)).  Thus, Abreu 
cannot reenter the United States because of his federal 
conviction, wholly apart from his state conviction, and the 
relief he currently seeks will do nothing to change this fact. 
   
Our analysis accords with that by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in a factually similar case.  See Perez v. 
Greiner, 296 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2002).  In Perez, a habeas 
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petitioner challenged his state robbery conviction.  He 
appealed the denial of his habeas petition, but he was removed 
to the Dominican Republic while his appeal was pending.  The 
government argued that Perez’s deportation made his petition 
moot because he previously had been convicted of a separate, 
drug-related offense that “render[ed] him permanently 
inadmissible to the United States.”  Id. at 126.   
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, 
holding that “[b]ecause Perez is permanently barred from this 
country on a wholly separate ground, the currently challenged 
robbery conviction can have no meaningful effect on his 
admissibility and hence cannot serve as a possible collateral 
consequence.”  Id.  It held that the habeas petition was, 
therefore, moot “because Perez is permanently inadmissible to 
this country due to his prior drug conviction, [so] collateral 
consequences cannot arise from the challenged robbery 
conviction.”  Id.; cf. Pola v. United States, 778 F.3d 525, 530 
n.3 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting in dicta that “[i]f [petitioner] were 
permanently inadmissible to the United States based on ‘a 
wholly separate’ prior criminal conviction, then we might 
evaluate mootness considerations differently”). 
 
The same is true here.  In 2003, Abreu was convicted in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one 
kilogram or more of heroin.  This federal drug trafficking 
conviction permanently prevents Abreu from returning to the 
United States, regardless of the validity of Abreu’s state 
conviction at issue in his habeas petition.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(C)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c).   
 
10 
Abreu does not contest this conclusion.  Instead, he 
attempts to invert the applicable standard, arguing that he is 
“only required to identify a continuing harm that may be 
alleviated by the outcome of the appeal.”  Abreu Letter 2 (Mar. 
10, 2020) (emphasis added).  But “the Supreme Court has 
disapproved of [a] broad presumption of collateral 
consequences without specific findings of injury-in-fact.”  
Steele, 236 F.3d at 134 n.4 (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–17).  
And the fact remains that, due to the existence of Abreu’s 
federal drug trafficking conviction, no matter how we resolve 
the instant appeal, that resolution will not alter his admissibility 
status and thus will not alleviate his inability to apply for 
reentry. 1   Cf. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 
(1957) (explaining that “review in this Court will be allowed 
only where its judgment will have some material effect”); 
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant 





1  Abreu relies on United States v. Sandoval-Enrique, 870 F.3d 
1207 (10th Cir. 2017), to argue that his appeal is not moot.  In 
that case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
a petitioner’s challenge to his conviction was not moot even 
though he had been removed and had prior convictions not at 
issue in his appeal.  That case, however, is distinguishable from 
this one because in Sandoval-Enrique, the petitioner’s prior 
convictions only barred him from seeking reentry to the United 
States for twenty years.  Here, by contrast, Abreu’s federal 




Nor are we persuaded by Abreu’s argument that he 
suffers from fear that reentry would cause him to serve the 
maximum remaining balance of his state sentence and would 
subject him to federal prosecution for illegal reentry.  These 
are not valid collateral consequences:  due to his federal 
conviction, Abreu’s reentry to the United States would be a 
new crime.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (providing that a removed 
alien who “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, 
the United States” without authorization commits a federal 
offense).  And collateral consequences that depend on an 
individual committing a crime cannot “breathe life” into a 
mooted controversy.  United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 
182 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Chong, 264 F.3d at 385 (rejecting 
petitioner’s argument that “possible prosecution for felonious 
entry” into the United States “creates sufficient collateral 
consequences,” and granting relief on other grounds). 
 
* * * 
 
So, even if we were to rule in Abreu’s favor on his state 
conviction, he would not be able to reenter the United States 
because our decision would not impact Abreu’s federal 
conviction.  And this means that Abreu cannot show “an actual 
injury . . . likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.”  Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477; see also Abdala v. INS, 488 
F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (“For a habeas petition to 
continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner’s 
release or deportation, . . . there must be some remaining 
‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by success on 
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the petition.”).2  Without a collateral consequence of Abreu’s 
state conviction that can be redressed by a favorable decision 
on his petition, there is no case or controversy under Article 




For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order denying the petition and remand this case to the 
District Court with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot. 
 
2  Of course, our holding today does not apply to cases where 
a removed petitioner’s return to the United States is barred by 
the same conviction or convictions challenged in the habeas 
proceeding, which may establish a live controversy under 
Article III.  See, e.g., Pola, 778 F.3d at 531 (holding that a 
habeas petition was not moot despite petitioner’s removal 
because he was inadmissible to the United States due to the 
conviction challenged in his habeas petition); Alwan v. 
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
petition for review was not moot, even though petitioner had 
been removed, because “[a]n important collateral consequence 
of our decision in this case . . . is whether [petitioner] will be 
permanently inadmissible to the United States”); Leitao v. 
Reno, 311 F.3d 453, 456 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the 
bar on readmission of a removed alien is a legally cognizable 
collateral consequence that preserves a live controversy even 
after deportation of the petitioner”). 
